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Abstract-	   It has become fashionable to extoll the benefits of an incumbent controlling shareholder in 
companies.  Indeed, many of the failures of the stewardship movement, that encourages shareholders in UK 
listed companies to take an interventionist approach to their investments, have been blamed on the prevalence of 
dispersed and fragmented ownership models.  However, in the publicly listed company sphere, it is debatable 
whether the virtues of controlling shareholders outweigh the potential detriments, as evidenced by the corporate 
governance travails of Sports Direct International plc.  This paper summarises the principal inherent benefits 
and detriments, and how these may have presented themselves in the experience of Sports Direct International 
plc; followed by a normative analysis of the effectiveness of certain regulations ostensibly created to constrain 
controlling shareholders, together with proposals for reform, arguing that the existing regulations have proved to 
be insufficient in constraining the controlling shareholder of Sports Direct International plc.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The ‘Fat Controller’ was a benevolent influence in a popular series of children’s books. 1  However, in 
the context of a listed company, the presence of a controller, being a single shareholder or related 
group of shareholders with sufficient control to definitively influence the composition of the board of 
directors (and therefore the ability to have a fundamental influence on the appointment and removal 
of managers) may not be unequivocally benign.  Such a shareholder, a ‘controlling shareholder’ for 
the purposes of this paper, is able to exercise such influence either legally (through holding a majority 
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of the votes in the company), or ‘effectively’ (by holding such a high proportion of the votes in the 
company that, although below 50 per cent, it has effective influence over the board given the 
dispersed nature of the remainder of the shares in the company). Controlling shareholders come in a 
variety of forms, whether individuals, companies or public bodies, management or non-management 
investors, or founders, families or heirs. 
Sports Direct International plc (Sports Direct) is a prominent example of a listed controlling 
shareholder company. The company was founded in 1982 by Mike Ashley, and obtained a premium-
listing on the Main Market of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) in 2007. Upon listing, Ashley 
retained control of the company - as of the end of the company’s 2016 financial year, he owned 55.14 
per cent of the shares in the company,2 and, therefore, was, and still is, a true controlling shareholder 
with the ability to determine the composition of the board.3 For a while, the company realised 
considerable success, becoming a member of the FTSE-100.4 However, a variety of controversies 
have tarnished the company’s name in more recent years, exacerbating share price declines. 2015 was 
an especially tumultuous year in the history of Sports Direct. After a media exposé, the company was 
accused of poor employee working conditions, as well as illegalities relating to minimum wage 
breaches and insufficient redundancy consultations. Matters did not improve in 2016, with allegations 
of nepotism arising as a result of transactions with family members of Ashley coming to light, as well 
as a minority shareholder revolt relating to the re-election of the company’s chairman and 
longstanding absence of a permanent finance director. More recently, further controversy transpired 
when the company attempted to make a £11m payment to Ashely’s brother for past service.5 Many 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Sports Direct’s Annual Report and Accounts for the financial year ended 24 April 2016 (Sports Direct’s 2016 Accounts) at 
45. 
3 Under the Companies Act 2006, s 168, directors may be removed from office by the passing of an ordinary resolution, 
which is, pursuant to the Companies Act 2006, s 282, a resolution that is passed by a simple majority.  Additionally, the 
articles of association of Sports Direct (at articles 103 and 104) specify that directors may be appointed by ordinary 
resolution, or by resolution of the board (provided that, in the latter case, such director retires at the subsequent annual 
general meeting, subject to re-appointment by ordinary resolution). 
4 The 100 largest companies by market capitalisation as maintained by a subsidiary of the London Stock Exchange. 
5 The payment was eventually abandoned after objection from the minority shareholders (RNS Number: 2530Z, 13 
December 2017). 
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institutional investors have blamed the problems at Sports Direct on Ashley’s unchecked power and 
influence as a controlling shareholder.6  Indeed, the chief executive of Manifest, the shareholder 
stewardship and engagement consultancy, agitated that: ‘Had Mike Ashley listened to shareholders 
four or five years ago, we might not be in the situation we're in at the moment.’7  Perhaps institutional 
investors should not have been particularly surprised, given that they were warned of the potential for 
such a scenario – the February 2007 prospectus for the initial public offering of Sports Direct stated, 
‘The interests of the Shareholder [Ashley] may conflict with those of the public shareholders.’8  This 
stark warning was repeated and alluded to throughout the prospectus. An element of caveat emptor 
therefore applies to the laments of institutional shareholders, but should the minority shareholders, 
and perhaps broader stakeholder groups, have been better protected by regulation? Taking into 
account the various corporate governance failures at Sports Direct in particular, this paper will look at 
the theoretical detriments of an incumbent controlling shareholder in the listed company sphere, and 
contrast these with the potential benefits, before scrutinising the fitness of certain existing regulatory 
protections against the impropriety of controlling shareholders, and proposing reform in relation 
thereto.       
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See: Andrea Felsted, David Oakley and Andy Sharman, ‘Sports Direct’s Mike Ashley walks away from bonus scheme’ 
Financial Times (16 July 2014) <https://www.ft.com/content/669515ac-0caf-11e4-90fa-00144feabdc0>, and the publication 
by the Investment Association ‘Adherence to the FRC’s Stewardship Code at 30 September 2014 – Detailed practical 
examples’ at 16-18.  Unless otherwise stated, all URLs were last accessed on 10 July 2017.   
7 As reported by Rebecca Marston, ‘Sports Direct: Ashley steps in as chief executive resigns’ BBC News (23 September, 
2016) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-37448915>. 
8 On page 8 of the prospectus, as reported by James Quinn, ‘Sports Direct's investors shouldn't be surprised by recent events 
- the retailer was Mike Ashley's baby from the outset’ Telegraph (7 September 2016) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2016/09/07/sports-directs-investors-shouldnt-be-surprised-by-recent-events/>. 
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2. The Controlling Shareholder Conundrum –  
‘Private Benefits of Control’ v ‘Reduction in Agency Costs’ 
 
In principle, it could be argued that a controlling shareholder should have the interests of minority 
shareholders at heart due to such controlling shareholder having the ‘highest use value’9 by virtue of 
being exposed by such a large shareholding. However, Ratner10 eloquently dismissed this argument 
stating that it is akin to ‘putting the lions in the same cage with the rabbits at the zoo, on the 
assumption that the lions will represent the rabbits' interests in negotiating with the keepers for food.’  
This quote shows that clearly there is scepticism that controlling shareholders will ‘behave’ of their 
own volition, and that, in fact, the presence of a controlling shareholder in a listed company could be 
detrimental to the interests of the minority shareholders. More generally, the broad cynicism in 
relation to the notion of controlling shareholders, was elucidated by Holderness and Sheehan11: 
‘…although the reasons for the public’s hostility are seldom specified, there is a vague notion that the 
voting power of large-block shareholders somehow harms small shareholders’. The distrust of a 
controlling shareholder largely manifests itself in the potential that, since such controlling shareholder 
has substantial influence over the operations of the company, it could extract various private benefits 
to the detriment of the other minority shareholders; often referred to as ‘private benefits of control’.  
There are many ways in which a controlling shareholder can extract private benefits. The 
gamut of such private benefits of control have been discussed extensively in the literature, so will 
only be considered briefly herewith to the extent that they are relevant in the context of Sports Direct. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 P. Flocos, ‘Toward a Liability Rule Approach to the “One Share, One Vote” Controversy: An Epitaph for the SEC’s Rule 
19c-4?’ (1989-1990) 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1761, 1797; R. Gilson, ‘Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: 
Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy’ (2005-2006) 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1641, 1651; and J. Dammann, ‘The Controlling 
Shareholder’s General Duty of Care: A Dogma that should be Abandoned’ (2015) 2 U. Ill. L. Rev. 479, 481. 
10 D. Ratner, ‘The Government of Business Corporations: Critical Reflections on the Rule of One Share, One Vote’ (1970-
1971) 56 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 20. 
11 C. Holderness and D. Sheehan, ‘The Role of Controlling Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations: An Exploratory 
Analysis’ (1988) 20 J. Financial Econ. 317, 318.  
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Perhaps the most egregious form of private benefit extraction is through what is 
euphemistically labeled ‘tunneling’. 12 This is the ‘the transfer of assets and profits out of firms for the 
benefit of those who control them’.13 The most common form of tunneling is where the relevant 
company enters into transactions with other entities, in which the controlling shareholder usually 
owns a greater proportion of the cash flow rights, on non-arm’s length terms unfavourable to the 
relevant company, effectively expropriating the minority shareholders in the relevant company. As is 
common with controlling shareholder firms, Sports Direct has entered into a number of transactions 
with entities linked to its controlling shareholder.14 Notwithstanding assertions by Sports Direct that 
such transactions took place on arm’s length terms,15 thereby dismissing incidences of tunneling, 
certain transaction, including with Ashley’s brother16, have attracted significant suspicion. Another 
form of tunneling may occur if management itself holds a controlling stake in the relevant company, 17 
through the award of excessive remuneration for such management18 (although in the presence of 
non-management blockholders, such remuneration is attenuated).19 The controversial 2015 bonus 
share scheme of Sports Direct is an example where minority shareholders were concerned that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The more serious nature of tunneling was highlighted by R. Gilson and J. Gordon, ‘Controlling Controlling Shareholders’ 
(2003) 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 785. 
13 S. Johnson et al, ‘Tunneling’ (2000) 90 Am. Econ. Rev. 22, 22.  The authors attribute the genesis of the term to the 
expropriation of minority shareholders in the Czech Republic (‘as in removing assets through an underground tunnel’). 
14 n 97 and 98. 
15 Sports Direct’s 2016 Accounts at 105. 
16 Sean Farrell, ‘Sports Direct uses Mike Ashley's brother's firm for overseas distribution’ Guardian (22 August 2016) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/aug/22/sports-direct-pays-mike-ashleys-older-brother-international-delivery>.  
Sports Direct’s auditors have claimed that the relevant transaction was not a ‘related-party transaction’ requiring disclosure 
in the accounts of the company, nor a transaction requiring shareholder approval – whether such a transaction raises 
concerns which regulation should limit will be considered in this article.  
17 It should be noted that Ashley continued on the board of Sports Direct after its listing, serving as the executive deputy 
chairman of the board until taking over the role of CEO.   
18 Holderness and Sheehan (n 11) 319.  
19H. Mehran, ‘Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance’ (1995) 38 J. Financial Econ. 163, 179; 
and M. Bertrand and S. Mullainathan, ‘Do CEOs set their own pay?  The ones without principals do’ (2000) National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 7604 March 2000 1, 29 and 35.     
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excessive remuneration would become payable to a controlling shareholder through his role as an 
executive director.   
Another form of private benefit is especially prevalent where controlling shareholders are 
individuals or families, rather than corporate shareholders.  In such a case, since a substantial portion 
of such shareholder’s wealth may be tied-up in the relevant company, the controlling shareholder may 
dictate a diversification of the company’s businesses in order to mitigate against the risks of being 
personally undiversified. Although it has been posited that even with dispersed ownership firms, 
companies, as they mature, become huge conglomerates of many unrelated businesses, 20 the situation 
is particularly common with controlling shareholder firms, 21  and such diversification may not 
necessarily be in the best interests of the minority shareholders who can themselves self-diversify by 
maintaining a varied portfolio. Sports Direct itself has diversified substantially over recent years, 
pursuing an acquisitive strategy expanding its business from sports retail and products to ‘premium 
lifestyle brands’, even moving beyond clothing.22 
It is possible, however, that Sports Direct’s expansion of its business empire is not related to a 
desire to diversify, but rather as a result of non-pecuniary private benefits. Although often 
academically neglected,23  from the perspective of minority shareholders, non-pecuniary private 
benefits, as opposed to simple and direct financial extraction, can be particularly insidious, since there 
may be large incentives for controlling shareholders to sacrifice firm value in their pursuit.24  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 J. Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Princeton University Press (1967)) 92. 
21 See: B. Cheffins, ‘Corporate Law and Ownership Structure: A Darwinian Link?’ (2002) at 41 (available at SSRN: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=317661 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.317661>).  
22 Sports Direct acquired interests in House of Fraser in 2014, and Findel plc in 2015 and 2016, followed by interests in 
Debenhams plc, French Connection Group plc, Agent Provocateur, and Game Digital plc in 2017. 
23 Gilson, (n 9) 1663. 
24 See: P. Gompers, J. Ishii, and A. Metrick, ‘Extreme Governance: An Analysis of U.S. Dual-Class Firms in the United 
States’ (2010) 23 Rev. Financial Stud. 1052, 1085 –‘A Majority owner…can rationally…sacrifice firm value…to maintain 
[non-pecuniary] private benefits of control.’ 
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Reputation and prestige, as well as the simple psychological worth of being in control25 are obvious 
non-pecuniary benefits. It is impossible to ascertain the intentions of Ashley in shifting the Sports 
Direct focus to luxury brands and retail – it could stem from a desire to increase the success of the 
company by targeting a potentially more profitable sector to replace or supplement the ailing principal 
business, or from a desire to enhance reputation and prestige. What is indisputable is that such 
decisions are those of the controlling shareholder. 
From a takeover perspective, since, palpably, an offeror can not take control without 
acquiring, in a consensual manner, the controlling shareholder’s stake, value-enhancing takeovers will 
be blocked unless the controlling shareholder is compensated for the loss of private benefits. In 
certain jurisdictions, this leads to the payment by the bidder of a significant control premium for the 
controlling block held by the controlling shareholder, compared to the price paid to minorities. The 
ability of Ashley to extract such a premium is mitigated in the UK as a result of rules requiring that 
minority shareholders are treated equally.26 However, the controlling shareholder may still block 
takeovers otherwise beneficial to the minority shareholders, 27  even if the private benefits the 
controlling shareholder wishes to retain are not financial, such as the endowment effect particularly 
applicable to individual or family controlling shareholders, 28  whereby sentiment, loyalty or 
paternalistic considerations dominate purely economic considerations.29 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 See: P. Aghion and P. Bolton, ‘An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting’ 59 Rev. Econ. Stud. 473, 
476; and A. Dyck and L. Zingales, ‘Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison’ (2004) Vol. LIX J. Finance 
537, 540. 
26 Rule 9 of the Takeover Code as published by the UK’s Panel on Takeovers and Mergers. Also see: Dyck and Zingales 
(ibid) 551.  
27 L. Bebchuk et al ‘Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of 
Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights’ in R. Morck (ed), Concentrated Corporate Ownership (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press 2000) 295. 
28 See: R. Daniels and P. Halpern, ‘Too Close for Comfort: The Role of the Closely Held Public Corporation in the Canadian 
Economy and the Implications for Public Policy’ (1996) 26 Can. Bus. L.J. 11, 20.  For an economic description of the term 
‘endowment effect’, see: D. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011) 289-299. 
29 Founders ‘hanging-on’ after their talents have waned, or transferring control to unsuited heirs can have a detrimental 
effect on firm performance (H. Cronqvist and M. Nilsson, ‘Agency Costs of Controlling Minority Shareholders’ (2003) 38 J. 
Financ. Quant. Anal. 695, 715). 
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The encumbrances posed by private benefits of control can be balanced against the positive 
aspects of controlling shareholders. In particular, agency costs in the form of self-serving activity by 
managers30, which, as widely discussed academically,31 often occur in the absence of adequate 
monitoring by shareholders, could be reduced. The presence of a controlling shareholder, as with 
Ashley at Sports Direct, should enhance monitoring of management, and therefore managerial 
accountability, given that management agency costs will have a significant impact on the value of the 
controlling shareholder’s stake in the company (consequently, the controlling shareholder also enjoys 
a large share of the benefits gained by better monitoring). Controlling shareholders are also further 
incentivised to stringently monitor management and use their substantial voting capacity to influence 
management, since controlling shareholders, particularly those that are individuals, are not usually 
well-diversified and exit of a large stake is not an easy option without depressing share price. 
 A controlling shareholder structure could also present further benefits, since, with dispersed 
ownership, individual institutional shareholders could be overly focused on short-term financial 
metrics,32 leading to company management, fearing that they can be removed as directors by the 
shareholders, prioritising short-term shareholder profits rather than investing in long-term projects 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 A detailed account of agency costs is beyond the scope of this study, but, succinctly, the principal managerial agency costs 
include (i) ‘shirking’ by focusing excessively on leisure time; (ii) overly committing time to other diversified business 
interests ahead of the business of the company; (iii) engaging in personal indulgences (such as ‘pet projects’ or ‘empire 
building’); and, most egregiously (iv) diverting the cash flow or assets of the company for personal gain (often described as 
‘rent seeking’). 
31 For example, M. Jensen and W. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure’ (1976) 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 308; and D. Fischel, ‘The Corporate Governance Movement’ (1982) 35 Vand. L. Rev. 
1259, 1263. 
32 Even though the traditional ‘efficient capital markets hypothesis’ (with the relevant literature discussed in R. Gilson and 
R. Kraakman, ‘The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency’ (1984) 70 Va. L. Rev. 549, 549) postulates that share price should 
reflect long-term performance, a body of study acknowledges that irrational short-term behaviours and informational 
asymmetries can be ‘systematic’ in nature leading to disproportionate short-term market bias (A, Shleifer, Inefficient 
Markets: An Introduction to Behavioural Finance (Oxford Univ. Press, 2000); R. Gilson and R. Kraakman, ‘The 
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias’ (2003) Harvard Law School Discussion Paper 
No. 446 1, 14; and M. Moore and E. Walker-Arnott, ‘A Fresh Look at Stock Market Short-termism’ (2014) 41 J. Law & 
Soc. 416, 421).   
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that could be profitable in the long-term, but perhaps detrimental from a financial perspective in the 
short-term.33 An obvious way in which the presence of a controlling shareholder could manifest itself 
in a long-term orientated board is through managerial stability. 34  Presuming that the relevant 
controlling shareholder itself bears a long-term outlook in relation to the prospects of the company, 
the management team will not be fearful of losing their employment if short-term metrics are not 
positive.35 Although, it can not be assumed that a specific controlling shareholder has a long-term 
perspective, since the nature and identity of the controlling shareholder is critical,36 to the extent that 
it does, the controlling shareholder structure will give the company the opportunity to follow such a 
strategy.  
 
3. The Importance of Constraints  
 
As outlined above, a controlling shareholder can moderate potential agency costs of management, on 
the one hand, but prejudice the interests of smaller shareholders on the other hand. A tradeoff exists37 
such that potential equity investors will have a preference for the presence of a controlling 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 For an account of the manner in which management of a dispersed ownership company can react to short-term orientated 
shareholders with short-term orientated behaviour, see: Moore and Walker-Arnott (ibid 430 and 438), and M. Jensen, 
‘Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity’ (Spring, 2005) Financial Management 5, 6. 
34 For instance, see: J. Ang and W. Megginson, ‘Restricted Voting Shares, Ownership Structure, and the Market Value of 
Dual-Class Firms’ (1989) 12 The Journal of Financial Research 301, 305. 
35 Controlling shareholder firms are also often associated with the development of strong and ingrained relationships with 
suppliers, customers, employees and other stakeholders (particularly true of family controlled companies – Cheffins (n 21) 
38), which is conducive to long-term strategy.  Additionally, such firms can limit the need to reduce managerial agency costs 
through implementing performance-related executive pay mechanisms which can exacerbate short-term behaviour by 
management (M. Maher and T. Andersson, ‘Corporate Governance: Effects on Firm Performance and Economic Growth’ in 
L. Renneboog, J. McCahery, P. Moerland and T. Raaijmakers (eds), Convergence and Diversity of Corporate Governance 
Regimes and Capital Markets (Oxford Univ. Press, 2000) 43 and 23; and Jensen (n 33) 14. 
36 Therefore, the propensity for controlling shareholders to take a long-term approach may be inflated (for example, 
Holderness and Sheehan (n 11) 338 found no statistical difference in controlling shareholder firms’ long-term investment 
compared to dispersed ownership models).   
37 The term the ‘controlling shareholder tradeoff’ was first coined by Gilson and Gordon (n 12). 
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shareholder if the benefits from decreased managerial agency costs are greater than the detriments (if 
any)38 from the extraction of private benefits by such controlling shareholder. If certain controls, 
limiting private benefit extraction, are in place, which are sufficiently ‘weighty’, the balance of the 
controlling shareholder tradeoff can be tipped in a direction that attracts minority investor investment 
in controlling shareholder structures. Such controls may be market-driven, psychological, or imposed 
through regulation.   
A counter-argument to the importance of constraints is that if minority investors foresee 
future expropriation by a controlling shareholder, they can simply apply a discount to the price at 
which they are willing to acquire shares upon a listing39 – a form of protection in so much that they 
would be purchasing the shares at a price that represents the potential expropriation by the controlling 
shareholder, and therefore earn a fair expected rate of return.40 However, it is extremely difficult for 
investors to fully anticipate the level and nature of expropriation by a particular controlling 
shareholder,41 and even if such expropriation were perfectly foreseen, such expropriation may not be 
fully embodied in equity price due to price reflecting the demand for shares by both minority and 
controlling shareholders,42 or due to potential expropriation that takes time to crystalise not being 
factored-in due to short-term biases in the market.43  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Private benefits could also be neutral or even positive for minority shareholders.  For example, synergies between a 
controlling shareholder’s separate businesses could be beneficial commercially to the relevant company, or the pursuit of 
greater prestige could have positive consequential effects on the success of the relevant company (M. Gutiérrez and M. Sáez, 
‘A Contractual Approach to Disciplining Self-Dealing by Controlling Shareholders’ (2017) 2 Journal of Law, Finance, and 
Accounting 173, 197; and J. Dammann, ‘Corporate Ostracism: Freezing Out Controlling Shareholders’, (2008) 33 J. Corp. L. 
681, 707). 
39 Gilson and Gordon (n 12) 5. Empirically, it has been shown that controlling block shares held by a controlling shareholder 
generally attract a premium, representing the private benefits of control (T. Nenova, ‘The Value of Corporate Voting Rights 
and Control: A Cross-Country Analysis’ (2003) 68 J. Fin. Econ. 325). 
40 Gutiérrez and Sáez (n 38) 179. 
41 See the discussion of the relevant empirical literature in Gutiérrez and Sáez (n 38) 180. Controlling shareholder actions 
may not be widely anticipated before they occur, nor widely known when they occur, meaning that they are not easily 
priced-in (Gilson and Kraakman (1984) (n 32) 592). 
42 M. Giannetti and Y. Koskinen, ‘Investor Protection, Equity Returns, and Financial Globalization’ (2010) 45 J. Financ. 
Quant. Anal. 135, 136 and 146. 
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  Turning to Sports Direct, at the time of the IPO, the listing was not only heavily 
oversubscribed, but the share price was at the upper end of the company’s valuation, suggesting that 
minority investors were not significantly discounting the shares of the company.44 They viewed the 
benefits of the presence of Ashley as a controlling shareholder as outweighing the risks of 
expropriation. Subsequent to the IPO, the various working practices and corporate governance 
controversies have clearly contributed to a depression in the share price of the company,45 signifying 
that the initial investors had not fully appreciated the downside risks. A number of other listed 
controlling shareholder companies have shown precipitous declines in share price after corporate 
governance failures, again showing that the potential for such failures had not been sufficiently 
priced-in at IPO.46 
The importance of constraints can therefore be stressed from two related angles: 
compensating for risk not being priced-in correctly, and reducing the risk in the first place to 
eliminate the need for discounts. On the first aspect, if shareholders can not protect themselves ex ante 
by pricing-in risk appropriately, it is important to ensure that they are protected on an ex post basis by 
ensuring the constraints restraining controlling shareholders are robust. On the second aspect, to the 
extent that shareholders do discount controlling shareholder structures, such a discount represents an 
increase in the cost of public equity capital, and harms those controlling shareholder companies that 
are well-governed and not subject to a controlling shareholder inclined to engage in significant 
expropriation. Stronger constraints can reduce the level of discounts, and also potentially improve 
investor returns47 and attract minority investors to the market.48     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 n 32 (particularly, Moore and Walker-Arnott (n 32) 420). 
44 See: Daily Telegraph article cited at n 8 above. 
45  From a review of Sports Direct historic market data as recorded and published by the Financial Times 
<https://markets.ft.com/data/equities/tearsheet/summary?s=SPD:LSE>, shares in Sports Direct were trading above 800p in 
August 2015, prior to news of the various scandals breaking, but had depressed to below 300p by the start of 2016. 
46 For example, ENRC (n 125 and 160), Bumi (n 145), Ferrexpo (n 153), and Essar Energy plc. 
47 See the discussion of the relevant empirical literature in Giannetti and Koskinen (n 42) 150. 
48 ibid 151 and 155. 
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A body of academic discourse has scrutinised the efficacy of market constraints49 and, to a 
lesser extent, psychological constraints50. It is acknowledged that such ‘organic’ constraints could, in 
the first instance, even in the absence of regulatory constraints, protect minority shareholders. 
Although a detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this article, it is suffice to say that given the 
adverse press to which Sports Direct has been subject, and the ire of shareholders towards the 
controlling shareholder and the board,51 such constraints were not, or are not, sufficient to adequately 
constrain a powerful, in terms of both voting power and personality, controlling shareholder. 
Therefore, the remainder of this article will focus on how, taking the example of Sports Direct and 
other pertinent controlling shareholder examples in the premium-listed company world, certain legal 
and regulatory constraints should be strengthened. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 The capital markets have a significant constraining effect on the behaviour of controlling shareholders, since, with regular 
expropriation, the inclination for investors to become minority shareholders is significantly diminished, or the price at which 
they will invest will be substantially lower - as identified in a number of studies, including A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, ‘A 
Survey of Corporate Governance’ (1997) 52 J. Finance 737, 749; R. La Porta et al, ‘Legal Determinants of External Finance’ 
(1997) LII J. Finance 1131, 1149; Maher and Anderson (n 35) 18; and L. Bebchuk et al (n 27) at 305. Therefore, there is an 
incentive on controlling shareholders to treat minority shareholders fairly in order to, amongst other reasons, keep open the 
option to tap the capital markets for further finance in the future, and to maintain a market to partially or fully exit at an 
acceptable price. 
50 For example, A. Dyck and L. Zingales, ‘Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison’ (2004) Vol. LIX J. 
Finance 537, 539.  Reputation is often a meaningful psychological constraint (Flocos (n 9 above 1777); C. Holderness and 
D. Sheehan, ‘Constraints on Large-Block Shareholders’ in R. Morck (ed), Concentrated Corporate Ownership (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press 2000) 151; and R. Gilson, ‘Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing Countries: 
Anchoring Relational Exchange’ (2007) 60 Stan. L. Rev. 633, 643)). 
51  See, for example: (i) comments by Leon Kamhi, Hermes Investment Management <https://www.hermes-
investment.com/blog/press/hermes-calls-substantive-changes-sports-direct/>; (ii) Legal & General Investment 
Management’s position statement dated 25 August 2016 
<http://www.legalandgeneral.com/advisercentre/campaigns/partnership-communications/pdfs/useful-
documents/Sports_Direct_AGM_Position_statement.pdf>; (iii) AGM statement by Euan Stirling, Standard  Life  
Investments, dated 7 September 2016 
<http://pdf.standardlifeinvestments.com/CG_Statement_Sports_Direct_AGM/getLatest.pdf>; and (iv) press release by the 
Investor Forum dated 25 August 2016 < https://media.wix.com/ugd/1cf1e4_92f4632de08048fd8f551d92adc5158b.pdf>. 
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4. Legal and Regulatory Constraints 
 
A plethora of laws and regulations exist in the UK evidently aimed at curtailing the powers of 
controlling shareholders, and, echoing the sentiment of Holderness and Sheehan above,52 protecting 
‘small’ shareholders. This article will examine in detail two specific areas of regulatory protection 
under the Listing Rules and their potential inadequacies:53 firstly the regulations relating to the 
election of independent directors to the board; and, secondly, the regulations pertaining to related-
party transactions. 
 
A. Selection of Independent Directors 
 
The UK Corporate Governance Code of the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) dated April 2016 (the 
Code) includes potential constraining mechanisms on controlling shareholders through minimum 
independent director provisions. Rather than providing for mandatory rules, premium-listed 
companies, such as Sports Direct,54 are obliged, under the Listing Rules,55 to either comply with the 
relevant provisions of the Code or explain reasons for deviations in the company’s annual report. The 
Code urges that at least half the directors, not including the chairman, on the boards of FTSE-350 
companies, including Sports Direct, are independent non-executive directors. 56  The Code also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 n 11 and accompanying text. 
53 The rules of the Listing Rules Sourcebook as published by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in its capacity as the 
UK Listing Authority (the Listing Rules), which apply to companies listed on the Main Market of the LSE.  
54 A premium listing gives companies a greater level of prestige and enhanced reputation within the market on the basis that 
they are perceived to be held to higher corporate governance standards than those with a standard listing.  A premium-listing 
is additionally significant since only shares with a premium-listing may be included on the FTSE indices, which is valuable, 
since certain investor funds will target such indices (for example, index tracker funds are required to invest in the companies 
comprising a relevant index, and fund managers subject to performance measurement against a particular index may seek to 
hedge risk by investing in such companies – see: B. Cheffins, ‘The Undermining of UK Corporate Governance (?)’ (2013) 
33 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 503, 507). 
55 LR 9.8.6(5)R and LR 9.8.6(6)R. 
56 Code provision B.1.2. 
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specifies that in determining the independence of directors, a relevant consideration will be if such 
director is a representative of a significant shareholder.57 Given that the Code also recommends that 
the chairman be independent upon appointment, 58  a controlling shareholder company in full 
compliance with the Code will, in theory, have implemented checks-and-balances to constrain the acts 
of a controlling shareholder through majority board voting being carried by directors independent 
from the controlling shareholder.59 
Further emphasising the importance of independent directors in the face of a controlling 
shareholder, the Listing Rules were amended in May 2014, in response to a wave of controlling 
shareholder listings60 and certain high profile abuses of power by controlling shareholders,61 to 
provide that, where a premium-listed company has a controlling shareholder,62 the election or re-
election of independent directors must be separately approved by both the ‘independent’ shareholders 
(non-controlling shareholders) as well as the full body of shareholders.63  If any such election or re-
election is not approved pursuant to this dual voting mechanism, and the company desires to 
persevere with the relevant election, a further vote must be held at a meeting at least 90 days but not 
more than 120 days after the original vote,64 and the relevant director, if already an existing appointee, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Code provision B.1.1. 
58 Code provision A.3.1. 
59 Accordingly, independent director presence could moderate the prevalence of tunneling through related-party transactions 
(J. Dahya et al, ‘Does Board Independence Matter in Companies with a Controlling Shareholder?’ (2009) 21 J App Corp Fin 
67, 76). 
60 Since the early 2000s, a number of foreign companies with significant blockholders have listed in London, especially from 
the mining and metals industries (Cheffins (n 54) 503). 
61 For example, in 2011, two independent directors were ousted from the board of the Kazakhstan company Eurasian Natural 
Resources Corporation (ENRC) by controlling blockholders acting in concert, after such directors criticised the corporate 
governance of the company and questioned the independence of the chairman.  This led to one of the ousted directors 
describing the premium-listed company as ‘more Soviet than City’.    
62 Subject to certain disregarded interests, a ‘controlling shareholder’ is any person who exercises or controls on their own, 
or together with any person with whom they are acting in concert, 30 per cent or more of the votes able to be cast on all or 
substantially all matters at general meetings of the company (LR 6.1.2AR).  
63 LR 9.2.2ER. 
64 LR 9.2.2FR. 
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may remain on the board during the interim period. 65  The resolution for such election will be passed 
at the subsequent meeting by a simple majority of votes exercised (including the votes of the 
controlling shareholder). 
Although the dual vote requirement was a flagship reform under the 2014 amendments, 
doubts about its efficacy came to the fore at Sports Direct after the institutional shareholders became 
sceptical that the board embodied sufficient independence to effectively act as a check-and-balance on 
Ashley and his executive team.66 In particular, the institutional shareholders were concerned that the 
chairman of the company was not providing sufficiently independent oversight. The requirement of a 
dual vote in relation to the appointment and re-election of independent directors should, in theory, 
give institutional shareholders the capacity to opine on the level of independence of those directors 
that the company has determined to be independent,67 and, consequently, on 7 September 2016, as 
part one of the dual vote, the independent shareholders of Sports Direct voted against the re-election 
of the chairman of the company.68 However, on 5 January 2017, as part two of the dual vote, at a 
shareholders’ meeting where Ashley was entitled to exercise his votes, the chairman was re-elected; 
this was the case even though the percentage of independent shareholders exercising their votes at the 
second meeting against the re-election was similar to that at the first meeting.69  If the purpose of the 
dual vote is to influence a controlling shareholder to either reconsider the re-election or appointment 
of the relevant director, or to restructure the board, for example by the addition of further independent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 LR 9.2.2DG. 
66 See: Publication by the Investment Association ‘Adherence to the FRC’s Stewardship Code at 30 September 2014 – 
Detailed practical examples’ at 17-19. Also, on 30 June 2014, Roger Barker, director of corporate governance at the Institute 
of Directors said that there was, ‘no effective check on Ashley’s power’ and that there was concern about ‘weak underlying 
governance’. 
67 Particularly since Sports Direct has generally complied with Code provision B.7.1 that urges FTSE-350 companies to 
submit its directors to annual re-election.  
68 RNS Number: 2290J, 7 September 2016 - 55.82 per cent of the votes exercised at the meeting by independent 
shareholders were against the re-election of the Chairman as a director. 
69 RNS Number: 4625T, 5 January 2017 - including Ashley’s shares, 80.92 per cent of the votes exercised at the meeting 
were in favour of the re-election of the Chairman as a director, but considering the independent shareholders solely, 53.96 
per cent of votes exercised were against his re-election. 
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directors, prior to the second vote to assuage minority shareholder concerns, plainly that purpose was 
not fulfilled in the case of Sports Direct. Looking at recent controversies at Sports Direct, some, such 
as the accusation levelled against the company that workers were being paid below minimum wage 
and subject to harsh working conditions, could also easily have occurred at a dispersed ownership 
company with a significant independent non-executive director element. However, others, such as the 
company delaying the appointment of a permanent finance director, the recruitment of an individual 
with a personal connection to the controlling shareholder,70 the investment in unrelated businesses,71 
the purchase of a corporate plane for £51.1m while earnings deteriorated,72 and the entering into of 
transactions with a company owned by a family member of the controlling shareholder73 may have 
been subject to more robust examination with a stronger independent element on the board.  With 
each such controversy, the concerns of institutional shareholders have been aggravated. 
The manner in which the dual vote procedure progressed at Sports Direct is not unique.74  The 
nascent regulations requiring a dual vote were further stress-tested at the FTSE-250 company 
Ferrexpo plc (Ferrexpo). As with Sports Direct, Ferrexpo has a controlling shareholder with a greater 
than 50 per cent voting interest in the company.75 On 19 May 2016, the re-elections of five directors 
that the board deemed to be independent were not approved by a majority of the independent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 In January 2016, Sports Direct entered into a consultancy agreement with the boyfriend of Ashley’s daughter pursuant to 
which he would lead ‘the Company's property team for the UK and internationally’ (RNS Number: 6376K, 4 January 2016).  
71 n 22. 
72 As disclosed in Sports Direct’s interim results for the 26 weeks to 23 October 2016 dated 8 December 2016, the company 
purchased a corporate plane for £51.1m while the group’s underlying earnings (before interest, tax, depreciation and 
appreciation) had decreased by 33.5 per cent, and profits (before tax) had fallen by 57.0 per cent. 
73 n 16. 
74 However, during the short lifetime of the dual vote regulations, it has been rare for independent director re-appointments 
at FTSE-350 companies to be opposed by independent shareholders (for example, as set out in Glass Lewis’ ‘2015 Proxy 
Season Highlights in the UK’ (at 9 and 10).  
75 As set out in Ferrexpo’s Annual Report and Accounts for the financial year ended 24 April 2017, Fevamotinico S.a.r.l. 
owned, as of 31 December 2016, 50.3% of the voting rights in the company (at 80), and, further underscoring the similarities 
to Sports Direct, the chief executive officer of Ferrexpo, Kostyantin Zhevago, is the indirect beneficiary of its controlling 
shareholder (at 50).  
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shareholders in the company.76 The board swiftly announced its intention to hold a second vote to 
ensure that at least two of the five directors would be re-appointed; with respect to the other three 
directors, the board stated that a second vote on such directors would be held unless replacements 
could be found in the interim in line with the board’s policy to replace each independent director after 
his or her ninth year of service. In fact, on 12 September 2016, all five directors were re-appointed 
pursuant to the second part of the dual vote where the controlling shareholder is permitted to exercise 
its votes.77 Two of those five directors retired on 28 November 2016,78 but nearly two years after the 
initial vote by the independent shareholders, three of the five directors still served as independent 
directors.79  Again, the full will of the independent shareholders was not observed by the controlling 
shareholder, and to the extent it was partially observed, it was only after an extended period of time 
that would not have been palatable to the independent shareholders.80  
The examples of Sports Direct and Ferrexpo illustrate that on the only occasions where the 
dual vote has come into play, it has not had the effect that the regulators intended in pressurising 
controlling shareholders to make substantive board room change.  It is also instructive, as shown in 
Table A appended, that where there has been significant, albeit less than majority, independent 
shareholder opposition to the re-election of directors, the relevant companies often do not make 
consequential changes to the board.  This suggests that companies and their controlling shareholders 
are not fearful of the consequences of potentially losing an independent shareholder vote on the re-
election of such directors in the future, possibly as a result of the comfort blanket of the controlling 
shareholder being able to exercise its votes at the second stage. Given such obduracy of boards and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 RNS number 7797Y, 19 May 2016. 
77 RNS number 6189J, 12 September 2016. 
78 RNS number 2165Q, 28 November 2016. 
79 Even though RNS number 1160I, 15 June 2017 announced the intention of the board to replace one such director, being 
the senior independent director, within a ‘few months’. 
80 One of the main reasons for the independent shareholders’ desire to remove such independent directors was that they were 
responsible for overseeing the deposit of US$174 million of the company’s funds in a failing bank owned by the controlling 
shareholder (see: n 153 and accompanying text).  An extended period of time after the independent shareholders had 
expressed their concerns during which such independent directors would still have had supervision responsibilities in 
relation to similar arrangements would have been an unsatisfactory state of affairs for the independent shareholders.  
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controlling shareholders to instigate change in such cases, it should not be unexpected that changes 
are also not being instigated sufficiently where an independent shareholder vote is both required by 
the regulations and lost. 
Many of the revisions to the Listing Rules in 2014 were made partly in response to the 
corporate governance debacle at ENRC.81 However, given the available evidence, it is difficult to 
argue that if the dual vote process had been in place while ENRC was a listed company, it would have 
constrained the controlling shareholders in any way – after all, the founders were certainly not shy in 
removing directors who were critical of the corporate governance standards at the company. At most, 
the regulations bestow independent shareholders with the ability to give a controlling shareholder a 
‘bloody nose’, and, at worst, the regulations just introduce a second administrative step whereby the 
controlling shareholder merely rubber stamps its authority.82 
 
B. Related-Party Transactions 
 
Chapter 11 of the Listing Rules specifically applies to premium-listed companies and also protects 
minority shareholders through a requirement that transactions, above certain materiality thresholds,83 
between the company and, amongst others, a substantial shareholder84 must at least be confirmed by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 n 61. 
82 The fund manager Fidelity International has also criticised the efficacy of the dual voting mechanism, with its head of 
corporate finance stating that in the specific case of the appointment or re-election of an independent chairman, the 
controlling shareholder should not be permitted to vote on any follow-on resolution after opposition by a majority of the 
independent shareholders on the initial vote.  The media labelled this proposal the ‘Anti-Ashley Clause’ (see: David 
Campbell, ‘Fidelity: directors should face boot over pay revolts’ CityWire Money (17 February 2017) 
<http://m.citywire.co.uk/money/fidelity-directors-should-face-boot-over-pay-revolts/a993007?listref=latest-news>). 
83 Transactions in the ordinary course of business are excluded under LR 11.1.5R, as are transactions below the thresholds 
set out in LR 11 Annex 1.1R (n 85). 
84 Subject to certain disregarded interests, a ‘substantial shareholder’ is any person who is entitled to exercise, or to control 
the exercise of, 10 per cent or more of the votes able to be cast on all or substantially all matters at general meetings of the 
company (or of any company which is its subsidiary undertaking or parent undertaking or of a fellow subsidiary undertaking 
of its parent undertaking) (LR 11.1.4R). 
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the company’s sponsor to be fair and reasonable to its shareholders and disclosed upon the entering 
into of the transaction, or, if large enough, be pre-approved by the other shareholders.85 In certain 
circumstances, 86  the materiality thresholds are disapplied in the presence of a controlling 
shareholder,87 further strengthening the effectiveness of the constraint.  
Pursuant to the 2014 amendments, the FCA further enhanced the Listing Rules in order to 
‘ensure that the protections afforded to holders of equity shares by the premium listing requirements 
are meaningful’.88 Premium-listed companies had already been required to maintain independent 
businesses, but this was fleshed-out with the inclusion of situations where such independence may be 
compromised, such as where a controlling shareholder has undue influence over the business of the 
company. Additionally, controlling shareholder firms became required to effect ‘relationship 
agreements’ with the relevant controlling shareholder, 89 pursuant to which the controlling shareholder 
must agree that: any transactions with the controlling shareholder or any of its associates will be 
conducted at arm’s length and on normal commercial terms; neither the controlling shareholder nor 
any of its associates will take any action that would have the effect of preventing the company from 
complying with its obligations under the Listing Rules; and neither the controlling shareholder nor 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Chapter 11 of the Listing Rules.  If the transaction in question is of a size large enough such that, upon the application of 
certain ‘class tests’, the ‘percentage ratio’ of any such class test is above 5 per cent, independent shareholder approval of the 
transaction is required prior to the company entering into that transaction (LR 11.1.7).  A detailed analysis of the class tests 
is beyond the scope of this article, but they broadly follow a classification of the size of a transaction against the size of the 
company in accordance with a gross assets test, a profits test, a consideration test and a gross capital test pursuant to LR 10 
Annex 1.  If all such class test percentage ratios are below 5 per cent, but one or more are above 0.25 per cent, independent 
shareholder approval is not required, but prior to entering into the transaction, the company must obtain confirmation from 
its sponsor that the transaction is fair and reasonable to its shareholders and the transaction must be publicly disclosed as 
soon as possible upon entering into the transaction (LR 11.1.10R).  If all class test percentage ratios are below 0.25 per cent, 
the Listing Rule requirements in relation to related-party transactions do not apply (LR 11.1.6R and LR 11 Annex 1).   
86 For example, where the company has breached its obligation to put in place a ‘relationship agreement’ with a controlling 
shareholder (n 89 and accompanying text), or in the case where a relationship agreement has been implemented, the 
company is aware that the independence provisions therein have been breached (LR 11.1.1AR).  
87 For the definition of ‘controlling shareholder’, see: n 62. 
88 LR 6.5.2G. 
89 LR 6.1.4BR and LR 9.2.2R. 
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any of its associates will propose or procure the proposal of a shareholder resolution that circumvents 
the proper application of the Listing Rules.90 
The importance of the Listing Rules in restricting potentially self-serving related-party 
transactions by controlling shareholders is highlighted by the lack of effectiveness in relying on 
potential breaches of directors’ duties. It could be argued that the directors would be in breach of their 
duties to the company in effecting, or consenting to, a related-party transaction between the company 
and the controlling shareholder that was not in the interests of the company,91 but it would be 
incumbent on the company itself, prima facie through its management organ, the board, to enforce 
those breaches against the directors. Naturally the zeal of a board to litigate against itself is slight, and 
therefore such a claim would be consigned to a minority shareholder or minority shareholders 
commencing a derivative claim on behalf of the company.92 Although derivative claims have become 
more accessible from a procedural perspective since they took on a statutory footing, from a practical 
perspective, for a minority shareholder with only a small interest in the relevant company, the 
potential benefits of making a claim will likely be far outweighed by the efforts and costs involved 
(since any successful remedy will accrue to the company itself). Furthermore, it would be just as 
beneficial for that shareholder to ‘free-ride’ on the efforts of another shareholder, and, additionally, it 
may be easier for the shareholder to merely sell its shares and exit. It is, thus, improbable that the 
prospect of a derivative claim will weigh heavily on a decision of a board (particularly a controlling 
shareholder on the board) in considering a related-party transaction,93 except in the most intemperate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 LR 6.1.4DR. 
91 For example, paraphrasing the Companies Act 2006, the duty to exercise independent judgment (s 173), the duty to 
promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole (s 172), the duty to act with skill, care and 
diligence (s 174), and the duty to avoid conflicts of interest (s 175).  
92 Pursuant to the Companies Act 2006, ss 260-264.  
93 Derivative claims are unlikely to form much of a deterrent to directors in this context – from a search on 14 March 2018 of 
the English case law database of Lexis Library using the terms ‘derivative claim’, ‘plc’ and ‘Companies Act 2006’, since 
derivative claims took on a statutory footing under the Companies Act 2006, there has only been one instance where a 
minority shareholder of a UK publicly listed company has applied for leave to commence a derivative claim, and in that case 
(Bridge v Daley [2015] EWHC 2121 (Ch)) leave was refused.  Likewise, it is rare for non-executive directors of publicly 
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of instances. Potential sanction under the Listing Rules, on the other hand, serves as a more potent 
deterrent.94 
On the face of it, the Listing Rules’ related-party provisions should considerably restrict the 
capacity of a controlling shareholder to enter into large self-serving transactions with the company.95 
However, even though Ashley has entered into a written and legally binding relationship agreement 
with the company,96 and Sports Direct has apparently complied with all related-party requirements, it 
appears that the current provisions have not prevented allegedly unpropitious behaviour by the 
controlling shareholder, nor been sufficient to pre-empt various controversies. 
For example, although Sports Direct disclosed certain transactions with companies directly or 
indirectly wholly-owned by Ashley, such as Newcastle United Football Club and St James Holdings 
Limited,97 and Double Take Limited (in which his daughter is a director),98 certain other transactions 
that were not initially disclosed have attracted controversy. These include a consultancy agreement 
between Sports Direct and the boyfriend of Ashley’s daughter,99 and a services agreement between 
Sports Direct and a company owned and controlled by Ashley’s brother.100 
Under the International Accounting Standards (IAS),101 related-party transactions must be 
specifically disclosed within the annual accounts.102 The FRC has commenced an investigation into 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
listed companies to suffer out-of-pocket liability (see: B. Black et al, ‘Liability Risk for Outside Directors: a Cross-Border 
Analysis’ (2005) 11 European Financial Management 153), diluting the deterrent effect further.   
94 Breaches of the Listing Rules can attract censure and fines enforced by the FCA, or in serious circumstances, a suspension 
or cancellation of the issuer’s listing (ss. 91 and 77 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000). 
95 Limiting the ability of the controlling shareholder to engage in ‘tunneling’ (n 13 and accompanying text).   
96 Sports Direct’s 2016 Accounts at 44. 
97 Sports Direct’s 2016 Accounts at 104. 
98 As disclosed in Sports Direct’s interim results for the 26 weeks to 23 October 2016 dated 8 December 2016 at 4. 
99 n 70. 
100 n 16. 
101 Pursuant to Article 4 of EC Regulation No. 1606/2002, companies with their securities listed on a regulated market in a 
European Member State must prepare their consolidated accounts in conformity with the International Accounting 
Standards.  This requirement is reiterated in the Companies Act 2006, s 403. 
102 IAS 24. 
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Sports Direct’s auditors with respect to the absence of a disclosure in relation to the transaction with 
the company owned by Ashley’s brother in the Annual Accounts of the company for the year ended 
24 April 2016,103 on the basis that a sibling would be considered to be ‘a close member of a 
controlling shareholder’s family’ under IAS 24. With respect to the transaction with the boyfriend of 
Ashley’s daughter, it is likely that a cautious auditor would also deem that to be a transaction with a 
close member of Ashley’s family, although the point is not free from doubt.104 
Beyond disclosure in the annual accounts required in accordance with IAS, as above, 
pursuant to the Listing Rules, certain related-party transactions must at least be confirmed by the 
company’s sponsor to be fair and reasonable to its shareholders and disclosed by the company upon 
completion, and, subject to size, pre-approved by the independent shareholders;105 however, there are 
two crucial qualifications: (i) generally, the relevant provisions only apply to related-party 
transactions that exceed requisite thresholds106, with the caveat that, in the case of a controlling 
shareholder company, if the relationship agreement with a controlling shareholder has been breached, 
the thresholds fall away;107 and (ii) curiously, the definition of ‘related-party’ under the Listing Rules 
is, in many respects, narrower than that under IAS 24.  Therefore, even if such controversial 
transactions had exceeded the materiality thresholds under the Listing Rules, the company may have 
been able to justify not initially divulging those transactions and, even if those transactions were 
particularly large, not seeking independent shareholder approval, on the basis that the counter-parties 
were not strictly within the definition of ‘related-party’ under the Listing Rules.108  Transactions with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Announcement PN68/18 of the FRC dated 28 November 2016. 
104 In effect, transactions with close members of the controlling shareholder’s family should be disclosed under IAS 24; 
‘close members of the family’ is defined as ‘those family members who may be expected to influence, or be influenced by, 
that person in their dealings with the entity’ (IAS 24, paragraph 9). 
105 n 85 and accompanying text. 
106 n 83 and 85.  
107 Listing Rules 11.1.1AR and 11.1.1CR. 
108 Under Listing Rule 11.1.4R, a ‘related-party’ is defined to be (i) a person who is (or was within the 12 months before the 
date of the transaction or arrangement) a substantial shareholder; (ii) a person who is (or was within the 12 months before 
the date of the transaction or arrangement) a director or shadow director of the listed company or of any other company 
which is (and, if he has ceased to be such, was while he was a director or shadow director of such other company) its 
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associates of a substantial shareholder,109 like Ashley, or companies in which they have substantive 
direct or indirect interests are caught by the regulations, as are transactions with companies whose 
directors are accustomed to act in accordance with the substantial shareholder’s instruction.  
However, the definition of associate, in the context of an individual’s family, only includes that 
individual’s spouse, civil partner or child. Taking Sports Direct as a real-world example, it seems akin 
to a lacuna that an individual’s sibling or child’s civil partner are not caught by the regulations.  It 
should be noted that there are no suggestions or evidence that either of the non-disclosed transactions 
are suspicious in any way, but the relevant controversy and bad publicity due to the perceived 
clandestine nature of the transactions could have been tempered if the transactions had at least been 
disclosed as related-party transactions and confirmed by the company’s sponsor as fair and reasonable 
under the Listing Rules. 
 Even if the counterparties under the relevant controversial transactions had satisfied the 
definition of ‘related-party’, it is doubtful that the controversy would have been doused, since it is 
likely that the relevant transactions would not have exceeded the materiality thresholds under chapter 
11 of the Listing Rules.110  As mentioned above, the materiality thresholds are dispensed with if a 
relationship agreement between the controlling shareholder and the company has been breached.  
Significant in this regard is that such a relationship agreement must include a term pursuant to which 
the controlling shareholder agrees that any transactions between that controlling shareholder and / or 
such controlling shareholder’s associates will be conducted at arm’s length and on normal commercial 
terms.111 Therefore, if any related-party transaction with Sports Direct had not been on arm’s length 
and on normal commercial terms, it would have had to have been disclosed and approved by the 
independent shareholders. On first blush, this would appear to be sufficient to protect the interests of 
the independent, minority shareholders. However, it has been posited that ‘arm’s length terms’ 
essentially necessitates that the relevant transaction has been conducted at market value, and that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
subsidiary undertaking or parent undertaking or a fellow subsidiary undertaking of its parent undertaking; (iii) a person 
exercising significant influence; or (iv) an associate of a related-party referred to in paragraph (i), (ii) or (iii). 
109 For the definition of ‘substantial shareholder’, see: n 84. 
110 n 85.  
111 LR 6.1.4DR.  Also see: n 90 and accompanying text. 
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determination of market value is not an exact science.112 ‘Market value’ could be deemed to be a 
value within a broad range.113 Furthermore, the subjective intentions of the directors at the time the 
relevant decision was made could also be germane;114 ascertaining such subjective intention is a 
notoriously difficult task. Therefore, so long as the transaction has been negotiated by the relevant 
parties on an independent basis without any element of duress from either side, on terms that could be 
obtained in a commercial transaction between two unrelated parties, such transaction would likely be 
considered to be on an arm’s length basis and on normal commercial terms. Following on from this 
reasoning, a transaction with a related-party may well be on an arm’s length basis and on normal 
commercial terms, but not necessarily better than the deal that the company could have achieved by 
transacting with another third party – a transaction could be on arm’s length terms but not necessarily 
the best deal that could have been obtained through a competitive tender process. Such a transaction 
could stand even though, with the benefit of hindsight, it is found to be a bad bargain.115 The potential 
for a relevant transaction to be effected with a related-party without a competitive tender open to third 
parties is high in the presence of a controlling shareholder, and given the broad appraisal of ‘arm’s 
length terms’ the company, and by extrapolation the minority shareholders, may not be getting the 
best deal.116 
      
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 E. Micheler, ‘Disguised Returns of Capital – An Arm’s Length Approach’ (2010) 69 Camb. L. J. 151, 185. 
113 ibid 185.  Also, in the context of determining whether a transaction at an undervalue is a disguised return of capital, in 
Clydebank Football Club Ltd v Steedman (2002) SLT 109, (2000) GWD 31-1217 [76] (Hamilton L), it was stated: ‘In 
assessing the adequacy of the consideration, a margin of appreciation may properly be allowed’. 
114 Progress Property Company Limited v Moorgarth Group Limited [2010] UKSC 55, [2011] 1 WLR 1 [29]. 
115 ibid at [29]. 
116 In the context of determining whether a transaction at an undervalue is a disguised return of capital, Lord Hamilton (n 
113) at [76] stated that: ‘If the transaction is genuinely conceived of and effected as an exchange for value and the difference 
ultimately found does not reflect a payment “manifestly beyond any possible justifiable reward for that in respect of which 
allegedly it is paid”, does not give rise to an exchange “at a gross undervalue” and is not otherwise unreasonably large, there 
will not to any extent be a “dressed up return of capital”’. 
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5. Proposals for Regulatory Reform 
 
Following on from the identification of inadequacies in the current regulations in the context of the 
election of independent directors and related-party transactions, this paper continues with proposals 
for regulatory reform.  
 
A. Selection of Independent Directors 
 
With regard to the independence requirements under the Code, the 2016 Annual Report of Sports 
Direct stated117 that the company had complied with the relevant requirements on the basis that four 
out of seven of the directors on the board were non-executives, all of whom the company considered 
to be independent.118 However, as above, the institutional shareholders still voted against the re-
election of the chairman in spite of the company’s declaration of independence. Additionally, 
notwithstanding that the Code specifies that independence may be prejudiced if a non-executive 
director has served on the board for more than nine years from the date of his or her first election,119 
the company maintained that all non-executives were independent even though the senior independent 
director had served on the board for more than nine years, and an additional non-executive had served 
on the board for almost eight-and-a-half years. Given the company’s affirmation of compliance with 
the Code with respect to independence, one formerly advocated solution - to mandate the 
independence composition of boards in the presence of a controlling shareholder120 - would be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Sports Direct’s 2016 Accounts at 47. 
118 Sports Direct’s 2016 Accounts at 49. 
119 Code provision B.1.1.  The FRC is consulting on strengthening this provision to include that such directors should not be 
considered independent rather than merely stating that such a quality is relevant in determining independence (FRC 
Consultation - Consulting on a revised UK Corporate Governance Code, December 2017).  
120 In October 2012, the Financial Services Authority published its Consultation Paper on ‘Enhancing the effectiveness of the 
Listing Regime and feedback on CP12/2’ (CP12/25), making a proposal that where a controlling shareholder exists in a 
premium-listed company, such company must, on a mandatory basis, ensure that a majority of independent directors serve 
on the board (at 14).  The proposal was not subsequently implemented. 
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unlikely, in and of itself, to have a substantive effect on controlling shareholder behaviour in the UK 
so long as the determination of independence is in the hands of the board. Even if regulation expressly 
provided that directors would not be considered to be independent if they had specific existing 
relationships with the company or controlling shareholder (akin to the factors that a board must take 
into account in determining independence under Code provision B.1.1), it would still be difficult to 
ascertain whether, in fact, notwithstanding avoidance of those relationships, the relevant director was 
independent in practice. 121  It is doubtful that mandatory regulation would satisfy the lack of 
confidence that institutional shareholders of a controlling shareholder company would have in the 
ability of those non-executive directors to exercise independent judgment in practice;122 the suspicion 
would always remain that those directors have been directly or indirectly cherry-picked by the 
controlling shareholder.  
However, the concerns of institutional shareholders could be assuaged through amending the 
current dual vote requirements. In the presence of a shareholder, or connected shareholders, owning 
greater than 50 per cent of the voting rights in a listed company, shareholders independent of such 
controller should be given the unfettered right to approve the appointment or re-election of any 
director that the board has nominated as an independent non-executive director – in effect, both the 
independent shareholders and the whole shareholder body exercising votes at the meeting must 
approve such appointment at the same meeting, and in the event that the independent shareholders do 
not pass the resolution, the appointment or re-election would be deemed definitively refused and not 
subject to a second resolution where the appointment may be ratified if sanctioned by the entire 
shareholder cohort (including the controlling shareholder) exercising votes at that second meeting as 
is currently the case. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 It would therefore appear that market forces or market constraints are sufficient drivers to ensure that Sports Direct is in 
full compliance with the independence provisions under the Code.  However, whether such independent directors are truly 
independent in practice is another matter entirely.  The potential for such ‘tick-the-box’ compliance with the Code where 
compliance is not necessarily equated with adherence to the spirit or principles of the Code is a common criticism of the 
‘comply-or-explain’ approach (for example, see: S. Arcot and V. Bruno, ‘In Letter but not in Spirit: An Analysis of 
Corporate Governance in the UK’ (2006) London School of Economics Working Paper 1; and M. Moore, ‘“Whispering 
Sweet Nothings”: The limitations of informal conformance in UK corporate governance’ (2009) 9 JCLS 95, 118.  
122 Daniels and Halpern (n 28) 59 and 60.  
 	   27	  
The fundamental issue of whether independent non-executive directors are effective in 
monitoring controlling shareholders should also be visited. Even with a substantive presence of 
outside directors, their efficacy in monitoring controlling shareholders is questionable. In the UK, 
currently, pursuant to section 168 of the Companies Act 2006, a controlling shareholder with the right 
to exercise greater than 50 per cent of the votes in a company can remove any director at will. It is 
therefore conceivable, given the prestige attached to the role of being a non-executive director on a 
premium-listed company board, that an ‘independent’ non-executive director may be hesitant to be an 
overly fierce watchdog with respect to a controlling shareholder who could remove such director from 
the board.123 By reforming the dual voting mechanism, as suggested above, so that independent 
director appointments and re-elections require the definitive approval of the minority independent 
shareholders, the independent directors would be beholden to two masters – the controlling 
shareholder and the minority independent shareholders – thereby diminishing the incentive for 
obsequious behaviour towards the controlling shareholder. Of course, there is always the possibility 
that if an independent director is too good, so to speak, at his or her job in monitoring a controlling 
shareholder, the controlling shareholder could still remove such independent director,124 but at least 
any replacement, designated by the board to be independent, will need to be sanctioned by the 
independent shareholders, and, in any case, the controlling shareholder may be dissuaded from acting 
to dismiss directors in such a manner for fear of adverse market consequences.125 
It is critical, though, that any such enhancement of the dual voting requirement should only 
apply where the relevant controlling shareholder can exercise greater than 50 per cent of the voting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 J. Seligman, ‘Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy’ (1985-
1986) 54 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 687, 722; Daniels and Halpern (n 28) 16; P. Halpern, ‘Systemic Perspectives on Corporate 
Governance Systems’ in S. Cohen and G. Boyd (eds) Corporate Governance and Globalization: Long Range Planning 
Issues (Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing Inc. 2000) 29; N. Kumar and J. Singh, ‘Outside Directors, Corporate 
Governance and Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence from India’ (2012) 4 Asian Journal of Finance and Accounting 39, 
44; and L. Bebchuk and A. Hamdani (n 128) 18. 
124 For a real world example of this, see: n 61.  
125 The experience of ENRC is pertinent.  The company’s corporate governance furore (n 61) resulted in a slide in share 
price (see: Helen Thomas, ‘ENRC bolsters board to improve corporate governance’ Financial Times (25 May 2012) 
<https://www.ft.com/content/393db758-a67c-11e1-968b-00144feabdc0>). 
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rights – the current dual voting requirements apply to any controlling shareholder able to exercise 30 
per cent or more of the voting rights.126 For a controlling shareholder that does not, while acting alone, 
have the power to remove directors from the board, it would be iniquitous to create a situation where 
potentially the other, minority, shareholders acting in cahoots with the board, could have control over 
the appointment of certain board members to the exclusion of the non-majority controlling 
shareholder (who can not subsequently remove such board members if dissatisfied). It is not the intent 
that the proposed reform should completely dis-enfranchise a controlling shareholder in this regard.127  
In the US (Delaware) context, Bebchuk and Hamdani128 go even further by espousing that 
minority shareholders should, in the presence of a controlling shareholder, have enriched rights with 
respect to specifically designated ‘enhanced independence directors’ – such minority shareholders 
would similarly have veto rights with respect to the initial appointment of such directors, but even 
stronger rights with respect to re-election, whereby the minority shareholders would be able to re-
elect such ‘enhanced independence directors’ in spite of any desire of the controlling shareholder to 
terminate the relevant appointment. However, it is submitted that, in a UK context, this would overly 
dis-enfranchise the controlling shareholder. Moreover, the proposals outlined herein are not intended 
to enable minority shareholders to endorse the election of independent directors to the objection of the 
majority shareholder. Independent directors would need to be approved by both the independent 
shareholders acting as a group and by the entire body of shareholders including the controlling 
shareholder. In that way, the unpalatable situation of a board composed of directors appointed purely 
by differing factions, and the attendant risks to trust and smooth information flow between directors, 
would not occur.  It is acknowledged that a deadlock scenario could occur where the minority 
shareholders and controlling shareholder do not agree upon a candidate. In such a case, the company 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 n 62. 
127 As long as the proposed reform only applies to true controlling shareholders holding more than 50 per cent of the votes, 
the controlling shareholder would always have a veto right over the appointment of any independent director (and, in 
practice, would likely have significant influence over the nomination of any such director), and complete control over the 
appointment of executive directors and non-executive directors that are deemed to not be independent.  
128 L. Bebchuk and A. Hamdani, ‘Independent Directors and Controlling Shareholders’ (2017) 165/6 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1271, 
1301. 
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would continue without complying with the independence requirements under the Code, and therefore 
having to suffer the potentially adverse market consequences from the perception that the board does 
not comprise sufficient independence. In practice, though, the reform proposal would lead to greater 
communication between the controlling shareholder and independent shareholders before the relevant 
vote in an attempt to form a consensus, in much the same way that the implementation of binding 
‘say-on-pay’ votes has appeared to create greater ex ante engagement between companies and 
shareholders.129 This author also welcomes the recent proposals to require premium-listed companies 
subject to significant voting opposition to engage meaningfully with shareholders.130 If the definition 
of ‘significant opposition’ were to also apply to significant opposition by independent shareholders in 
the context of the dual vote, it is unlikely that such a deadlock would persist for a long period of time, 
especially given the importance that premium-listed companies attach to complying with the Code’s 
board independence requirements.131 
 
B. Related-Party Transactions 
 
Taking into account the controversial transactions of Sports Direct outlined above, at the very 
minimum, there is a strong case to extend the definition of ‘related-party’ to the more extensive 
definition of ‘associate’ pursuant to the Financial Conduct Authority’s Consumer Credit Sourcebook.  
The definition used therein132 covers a spouse or civil partner of the relevant person, and any relative 
of the relevant person, as well as a spouse or civil partner of such relative. ‘Relative’ would clearly 
encompass a brother and a daughter, and therefore, with such an extended definition, the transactions 
of Sports Direct with Ashley’s brother, and with the civil partner of his daughter, if they had exceeded 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 R. Thomas and C. Van der Elst, ‘Say on Pay Around the World’ (2015) 92 Wash. U. L. Rev. 653, 730; and the August 
2017 CIPD Research Report ‘Executive Pay - Review of FTSE 100 executive pay packages’ at 2. 
130 FRC Consultation (n 119) at 9. 
131 Pursuant to Grant Thornton’s 2017 Corporate Governance Review (at 28), only around 8% of the report’s sample of 
FTSE-350 companies did not comply with the independence requirements under B.1.2 of the Code. Also, see: n 121. 
132 The definition tracks the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 (as amended by the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2013), s 60(L). 
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the relevant materiality thresholds, would have been ‘related-party transactions’ requiring disclosure, 
sponsor confirmation of fairness, and, if sizeable, shareholder pre-approval under the Listing Rules, 
rather than independent shareholders having to wait for disclosure ex post in the annual accounts 
pursuant to IAS 24.  
As mentioned, even with an extended definition of ‘related-party’, if such transactions were 
below the relevant thresholds,133 they would still not require a fairness opinion from the company’s 
sponsor and disclosure as soon as possible after completion. It has further already been expressed in 
this article that the disapplication of the thresholds upon relationship agreement breach does not 
adequately protect minority shareholders given the vagueries of the concept of ‘arm’s-length terms’. It 
is therefore hereby advocated that, with an incumbent controlling shareholder, it would be judicious to 
ensure that all transactions, no matter size, with the controlling shareholder and its associates are, at 
the very least, disclosed at the time of the transaction and confirmed by the company’s sponsor to be 
fair and reasonable to the shareholders, to eliminate any perception of nefarious conduct and 
encouraging the controlling shareholder to justify the business benefit for the company in each 
case.134  
A revision to the regulations on related-party transactions in the presence of a controlling 
shareholder can be further justified by exploring the only two instances, as of the date of this article, 
where the FSA135 or FCA has sanctioned companies for breaches of such provisions. Unsurprisingly, 
both instances involved companies with controlling shareholders. In 2015, the FCA issued a final 
notice in relation to breaches of, amongst other things, the related-party provisions of the Listing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 n 85. 
134 Although, such prudence is only necessary in the presence of a ‘controlling shareholder’ (defined as set out in n 62) as 
opposed to a mere ‘substantial shareholder’ (defined as set out in n 84), since the influence of a substantial, non-controlling 
shareholder to cause the company to enter into such potentially ‘bad’ bargains with related parties will be necessarily 
reduced as compared to that of a controlling shareholder.  Therefore, with respect to mere ‘substantial shareholders’ the 
regulations as they currently stand are adequate.  
135 The FSA, being the Financial Services Authority, had responsibility for the regulation of the financial services industry 
until it was abolished on 1 April 2013, at which time its responsibilities vis-à-vis the Listing Rules were assumed by the 
FCA. 
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Rules by Asia Resource Minerals plc.136 The company, formerly known as Bumi plc, along with 
ENRC,137 is often held out as the poster child for controlling shareholder abuses. The company was 
found to have breached the relevant regulations with respect to three admitted related-party 
transactions. Two of those transactions individually exceeded the thresholds that required the 
company to obtain sponsor confirmation as to the fairness and reasonableness of the terms and to 
disclose such transactions upon entering into them, pursuant to chapter 11 of the Listing Rules,138 
while the third transaction was subject to the same rules as a result of the requirement to aggregate the 
value of all transactions with the same related-party within a period of twelve months.139 It appears 
that the company did not implement adequate internal procedures to identify the relevant related-party 
transactions, 140 which were only discovered after the company’s financial advisor was requested to 
investigate various financial irregularities within the company. In this case there was significant 
uncertainty as to whether the transactions exceeded the relevant related-party transaction materiality 
thresholds,141  and, as such, the company should have obtained sponsor guidance.142  Of further 
particular note, in the context of the reforms proposed by this article, are a number of ‘other 
transactions’ amounting to US$225.3 million identified by the financial advisors as having no clear 
business purpose or where the ultimate beneficiary was unclear. The company stated that it 
considered certain of these transactions were in the ordinary course of business143 and no further 
related-party analysis was required on that basis.144 Subsequent to the internal investigation, those 
‘other transactions’ became the subject of a controversial and long-running legal dispute between the 
company and Rosan Roeslani, a non-executive director of the company, and the president of one of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 The FCA’s Final Notice to Asia Resource Minerals plc dated 12 June 2015 (the Asia Resource Final Notice). 
137 See: n 61, and n 158 and accompanying text. 
138 n 85. 
139 Pursuant to LR 11.1.11R.  See: paragraphs 5.13 to 5.15 of the Asia Resource Final Notice. 
140 The relevant admitted related-party transactions took place between 28 June 2011, the date of the company’s listing, and 
19 July 2013. 
141 n 83 and 85. 
142 Paragraph 2.10 of the Asia Resource Final Notice. 
143 See; paragraph 4.42 of the Asia Resources Final Notice. 
144 n 83. 
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the company’s subsidiaries.145 Significantly, Roeslani was a substantial shareholder in the company 
and also had close connections with the major shareholder of the company, the Bakrie family.146 If the 
carve-out for ‘ordinary course of business’ transactions and the materiality thresholds were not 
available in the presence of a controlling shareholder, in relation to the admitted related-party 
transactions, the company would not have been subject to any level of uncertainty and would have 
identified those transactions as related-party transactions immediately. Furthermore, in relation to the 
transactions that became the subject of alleged wrong-doing, they would surely have been highlighted 
as related-party transactions, and therefore subject to greater scrutiny by both the company and its 
shareholders, requiring ex ante sponsor confirmation as to the fairness and reasonableness of their 
terms and immediate disclosure. The FCA, in criticising the internal procedures of the company, 
noted the increased risks inherent in its group structure and subsidiary director relationships, as well 
as potential conflicts between the company’s founding shareholders, operations and subsidiaries.147   
Exillon Energy plc is another controlling shareholder firm that was the subject of a FSA Final 
Notice148 for breaches of the related-party transaction provisions of the Listing Rules. The transactions 
in question involved payments for expenses to the chairman who was also indirectly the beneficial 
owner of the controlling shareholder.149  The persons internally responsible for approving such 
transactions did not identify them as related-party transactions since they viewed such payments as 
being in the recipient’s capacity as an employee, notwithstanding that he was also a director and 
controlling shareholder.150 The fact that each individual payment was minimal will have also had a 
bearing on them being missed by the responsible persons, since larger payments would surely have set 
alarm bells ringing. Accordingly, the company failed to aggregate the relevant transactions in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 News of the internal investigation into financial irregularities in the company resulted in a drastic fall in share price (see: 
Helen Thomas, ‘Bumi looks into alleged irregularities’ Financial Times (28 September 2012) 
<https://www.ft.com/content/74b8874c-08ae-11e2-b57f-00144feabdc0?mhq5j=e1>).  
146 See: Panel Statement 2012/9 of the UK’s Panel on Takeovers and Mergers. 
147 See: paragraphs 2.7 and 5.5 of the Asia Resources Final Notice. 
148 FSA Final Notice to Exillon Energy plc dated 26 April 2012 (the Exillon Final Notice). 
149 Annual Report and Accounts of Exillon Energy plc for the financial year ended 31 December 2009 at 23. 
150 See: paragraph 19 of the Exillon Final Notice.  Directors and controlling shareholders are clearly related parties under the 
Listing Rules (LR 11.1.4R (1) and (2)).  
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determining whether the threshold for notification had been surpassed.151 Although it can not be said 
for certain that the breach would still not have occurred if the thresholds were eliminated in the 
presence of a controlling shareholder, the evaluation process would have been far simpler and the 
minds of those responsible would certainly have been more sharply focused. 
There are plentiful other examples of controlling shareholder controversies that would not 
have been so contentious if the relevant transactions had been required be confirmed as fair and 
reasonable, and immediately disclosed, to minority shareholders. For example, the circumstances 
prompting the independent shareholders of Ferrexpo to vote against the re-election of certain 
independent directors152 involved the insolvency of a Ukrainian bank in which the company had 
deposited US$174 million of its total cash balance of US$280 million.153  The bank was controlled by 
the controlling shareholder of Ferrexpo.  Even though the deposit of funds in a bank account would 
very much fall within the ambit of the ‘ordinary course of business’ exception under the related-party 
transaction regulations,154 it would obviously have been provident for the arrangement as a whole to 
have been disclosed to the shareholders and subject to a fair and reasonable qualification by the 
company’s sponsor given	  the	  large	  funds	  involved.155	  	  This	  is	  particularly	  felicitous	  given	  that	  the	  company’s	  allocation	  of	  the	  liquidation	  proceeds	  may	  be	  hampered	  by	  the	  related-­‐party	  nature	  between	   the	   company	   and	   the	   bank.156	   ENRC, a company which is no stranger to controlling 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 See: n 139 and accompanying text. 
152 n 75 to n 80 and accompanying text. 
153 The bank was declared insolvent on 17 September 2015 (RNS number 4726Z, 18 September 2015). 
154 It would also have been unlikely that the deposit of funds in a bank account would have been on anything other than on 
arm’s length terms; hence it would not have constituted a breach of the relationship agreement between the company and its 
controlling shareholder, and the relevant materiality thresholds (including the ‘ordinary course of business’ exemption) 
would not have been triggered. 
155 Upon the bank being declared insolvent, the price of shares in Ferrexpo dramatically fell by around a third (James Wilson 
and Roman Olearchyk, ‘Shares in Ferrexpo hit by bank closure’ Financial Times (18 September 2015) 
<https://www.ft.com/content/9431c744-5dd5-11e5-9846-de406ccb37f2?mhq5j=e1>.  
156 The liquidator in the insolvency proceedings classed the subsidiaries of Ferrexpo which had deposited funds in the 
insolvent bank as ninth in creditor priority in the liquidation on the basis of such subsidiaries being ‘related parties’ to the 
bank (note 35 to the financial statements as set out in the Annual Report of Ferrexpo for the year ended 31 December 2016 
at 143). 
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shareholder abuses,157 also courted controversy when it was discovered that it had sold a subsidiary to 
the nephew of one of its controlling founders.158 As outlined above, a nephew of a controlling 
shareholder would not be deemed to be a related-party pursuant to the Listing Rules, but would likely 
be considered to be a related-party for the purposes of IAS.  Additionally, the company suggested that 
the transaction did not need to be disclosed since it did not meet the materiality thresholds requiring 
disclosure.159 Therefore, an expansion of the definition of related-party to include ‘relatives’ of the 
controlling shareholder as promoted above, together with a relaxation of the materiality thresholds in 
the presence of a controlling shareholder, would have brought this transaction within the ambit of the 
related-party provisions of the Listing Rules requiring confirmation of fairness and prompt disclosure.  
This would have prevented the episode adding to the litany of negative publicity that besieged ENRC 
and depressed its share price during its time as a listed company.160  
Although regulations will always need to tread a fine line between protecting against all 
eventualities and impinging detrimentally on the ability of a company to conduct business smoothly 
and efficiently, given the risks that are inherent in controlling shareholder structures, it would be 
prudent, in such situations, that all related-party transactions are at least subject to sponsor 
confirmation of fairness and reasonableness and disclosed to the shareholders as soon as possible after 
the transaction is effected, rather than merely disclosed much later pursuant to IAS. It would not be an 
overly onerous process for firms to implement, and, in relation to transactions conducted with specific 
counterparties on a regular basis, a streamlined process could be formulated with the company’s 
sponsor. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 n 61. 
158  Simon Goodley, ‘ENRC subsidiary sold secretly to nephew of co-founder’ Guardian (14 February 2013) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/feb/14/enrc-mining-company-subsidiary-sold-secretly>.   
159 ibid. 
160 ENRC was de-listed from the Main Market of the LSE in November 2013, after the founders re-acquired the company.  
At the time of the company’s listing, shares were listed at 540p, but share price had fallen to 217.25p by the time it was 
taken private.  ENRC produced a total shareholder return of minus 54 per cent since its 2007 listing (James Wilson, Jonathan 
Guthrie and David Oakley, ‘ENRC “should have set off alarm bells”’ Financial Times (22 November 2013) 
<https://www.ft.com/content/1995e548-5368-11e3-b425-00144feabdc0?mhq5j=e1>).  
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The thresholds could be retained for the purposes of determining whether pre-approval by 
independent shareholders is required. One may ask why the reforms proposed by this article, requiring 
that all related-party transactions in the presence of a controlling shareholder be subject to a sponsor 
fairness confirmation and prompt disclosure, should not go further and recommend that all such 
transaction should be pre-approved by minority shareholders. It is acknowledged that there is merit in 
the argument, with the example of Ferrexpo being apposite in this regard – the potential loss to the 
company upon the insolvency of the bank is considerable, yet it is unlikely that individual bank 
deposits would have been deemed to be individual ‘transactions’ or ‘arrangements’ for the purposes 
of the Listing Rules; and, therefore, the general deposit arrangement with the bank would have been 
unlikely to have exceeded any particular materiality thresholds.  However, given the vast risks to the 
company in depositing large sums with a single Ukrainian bank,161 it would have been beneficial to 
the independent shareholders to have had the opportunity to pre-approve the arrangement in the first 
instance which would likely to have required the company to outline exactly how much it was 
intending to deposit with such bank going forward. The independent shareholders may well have 
pressed the company to diversify its Ukrainian accounts beyond the single bank owned by the 
controlling shareholder. It is essential, though, that regulatory reform does not have a chilling effect 
on controlling shareholders listing their firms in the UK given that controlling shareholders can also, 
when restrained by appropriate constraints, provide valuable benefits to firms. Requiring that all 
related-party transactions, notwithstanding size, should be pre-approved by independent shareholders 
would be a controversial development, and would need to be implemented carefully so as not to 
impinge upon the ability of the firm to conduct its business efficiently. Therefore, it is not hereby 
advocated that mandatory pre-approvals should be implemented, and instead mandatory sponsor 
fairness confirmation and prompt disclosure, as already extolled, should be applied as a first measure. 
The pre-approval of all related-party transactions in the presence of a controlling shareholder could, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 In fact, the company highlighted the weakness and undercapitalisation of the Ukrainian banking sector as a risk factor for 
the company’s business in its Annual Report for the year ended 31 December 2014 (at 27); this casts further doubt on the 
rationality of holding the majority of the company’s cash balance in a single account.  
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though, form an area ripe for further study162 if the more moderate proposals outlined herein are found 
to be lacking when put into practice.   
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper has outlined the problematic theoretical consequences of the presence of a controlling 
shareholder in a listed company vis-à-vis the interests of the minority shareholders. Such theoretical 
consequences are also grounded in real world issues for listed companies as observed at the UK 
premium-listed company Sports Direct International plc. However, controlling shareholder structures 
do not solely present a myriad of detrimental outcomes for minority investors, and, as encapsulated by 
this paper, they can also present various benefits to a company with a corresponding increase in firm 
value profiting minority and controlling shareholders alike. In the context of Sports Direct, the 
controlling shareholder’s experience and expertise in the business sector, as well as his incentive to 
ensure the long-term success of the company by virtue of his large shareholding in the company, are 
factors promoting the benefit of a controlling shareholder. For all the controversies surrounding 
Sports Direct, shareholders recognise the importance of the controlling shareholder to the business.163 
The reforms proposed by this article are therefore intentionally limited to ensure that they bolster the 
protections available to minority shareholders without being so onerous to substantially discourage 
controlling shareholders from listing on the LSE. It would not be constructive to the success of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 For example, pre-approval of all related-party transactions could be implemented on a best practice basis through the 
Code rather than on a mandatory basis, or could be subject to certain enabling provisions, such as relaxed rules for specific 
types of controlling shareholders, blanket approvals for transactions with specific counterparties within certain limits, or 
deemed approval of transactions pre-disclosed in the listing prospectus or offer document, at the time of listing or upon the 
takeover of the company by the controlling shareholder, respectively.  
163 For example, Crispin Odey, the founder of Odey Asset Management LLP, a large minority shareholder in Sports Direct, 
was quoted: ‘I’m very happy with him [Ashley]: he's a natural winner.  From our point of view we always like to find 
entrepreneurs to back and I am very happy to be buying anything on eight times' earnings, especially when they have a 
proven track record like Sports Direct.’ (see: Deirdre Hipwell and Harry Wilson, ‘Mike Ashley?  He’s a natural winner, says 
Sports Direct backer’ Times (7 January 2017) <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/mike-ashley-hes-a-natural-winner-says-
sports-direct-backer-txt3n6z7t>). 
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UK economy for net positive controlling shareholder firms to choose other jurisdictions over the UK 
for initial public offerings of their equity interests. 
The key is ensuring that the ‘controlling shareholder tradeoff’ is titled in such a direction to 
ensure that the benefits of a controlling shareholder outweigh the potential detriments. If constraints 
subsist that effectively limit the ability of a controlling shareholder to extract private benefits of 
control to the detriment of minority shareholders, the tradeoff can be shifted to an advantageous 
position for minority investors. In the UK, there are various constraining mechanisms, including the 
markets, psychological constraints, and legal and regulatory requirements. The markets in the UK 
have sufficient strength to ensure that controlling shareholders do not disgruntle minority shareholders 
too extensively for fear of creating large-scale exit by minority investors and difficulties in garnering 
further investment at an acceptable price – creating a commensurate diminution in share price.  
However, as is evident from the travails of Sports Direct and dissatisfaction asserted by minority 
shareholders, those market constraints are not sufficient to eliminate much unwelcome conduct. In the 
absence of adequate market and psychological constraints, regulation has an important part to play. 
This paper has set out certain specific deficiencies in current regulatory requirements 
ostensibly effected to constrain controlling shareholders. In particular, existing regulatory constraints 
can be enriched by: (i) strengthening (where a controlling shareholder is able to exercise greater than 
50 per cent of the votes attached to shares in the company) the dual voting requirements to give 
independent shareholders a definitive veto right over the election and re-election of independent 
directors; and (ii) extending the range of transactions that should be disclosed to minority 
shareholders, and opined upon by the firm’s sponsor, through expanding the definition of ‘related-
party’ and dispensing with certain materiality thresholds in the presence of a controlling 
shareholder.164  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 In the context of attracting the proposed listing of Saudi Aramco to the LSE, the FCA has published a consultation on 
creating a new premium-listing category for sovereign controlled companies (FCA Consultation Paper CP17/21).  Under the 
proposals, the sovereign controlling shareholder would not be considered to be a related-party under the Listing Rules, and 
the company would not be subject to certain of the enhanced controlling shareholder provisions that were implemented in 
May 2014 (including the aspects related to the dual vote on independent directors and relationship agreements outlined in 
this article).  Although different considerations may apply to sovereign controlling shareholders specifically, based upon the 
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With such proposed regulatory changes, certain of the controversial acts carried out by Sports 
Direct may not have occurred or would, at least, have been subject to greater scrutiny; but at the same 
time such proposed changes would not be so astringent to deter benign controlling shareholders from 
listing their firms in the UK in the first place. With targeted and thoughtful amendments to regulation, 
the benevolent ‘fat controller’ of children’s lore could become a source of optimism rather than a 
source of distrust in the UK listed company domain. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
discussion set forth in this article, such a relaxation of the rules should certainly not be extended to controlling shareholder 
firms generally, and, in fact, the rules should instead be reinforced as specified herein.   
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Table A: Significant Opposition by Independent Shareholders to Director Re-elections 
 
Company Date of Vote Controlling 
Shareholder 
ownership  
Result of vote Consequence 
Georgia Healthcare 
Group plc 
1 June 2017 64.21% as of 31 
March 2017165 
38.99% of 
independent 
shareholders voted 
against the re-election 
of Jacques Richier166 
The board, in 
assessing such 
significant 
opposition, 
maintained that the 
director continued to 
act as an effective 
independent director 
Schroders plc 28 April 2016 47.93% of the voting 
rights as of 31 
December 2016167 
11.8% of independent 
shareholders voted 
against the re-election 
of Lord Howarth of 
Penrith, the senior 
independent 
director168 
No significant 
corporate 
governance changes 
initiated 
Hochschild Mining 
plc 
12 May 2017 54.03% as of 31 
December 2016169 
28.03% of 
independent 
shareholders voted 
against the re-election 
of Jorge Born Jr.170 
The board 
concluded that the 
director still 
continued to act as 
an effective 
independent non-
executive even 
though his service 
exceeded nine years 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  165	  Annual Report and Accounts of Georgia Healthcare Group plc for the financial year ended 31 December 2016 at 119.	  166	  RNS number 9125G, 1 June 2017.	  167	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Company Date of Vote Controlling 
Shareholder 
ownership  
Result of vote Consequence 
Fresnillo plc 4 May 2016 75% at the time of the 
vote171 
29.87% of 
independent 
shareholders voted 
against the re-election 
of Charles Jacobs172 
Company did not 
even acknowledge 
high voter 
discontent 
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  Annual Report of Fresnillo plc for the year ended 31 December 2015 at 22, and the Annual Report of Fresnillo plc for 
the year ended 31 December 2016 at 26. 172	  RNS number 1379X, 4 May 2016.	  
